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Whether for Chilean NAFTA
(or NAFTA "Light") Accession:
The Necessity of Fast Track Authority
PascualCovarrubiasMeyer*
The full economic integration of the Americas is quickly becoming a reality. The prevailing urgency is that the United States is possibly faced with losing its position as the
dominant driving force in the future of this hemisphere's trade policy. Simply put, the
United States is not actively directing the path trade agreements are taking now or in the
future. In addition, while Congress delays granting fast-track authority to the executive
branch, other opportunistic agreements, such as trade blocs like Mercosur and bilateral
trade agreements, are being drafted and ratified at breakneck speed. This comment first
examines Congress' lagging ratification of fast-track authority and the extent to which this
procrastination is hurting business opportunities for U.S. firms, as well as this country's
future role in setting the agenda and direction of the forthcoming Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). In addition, this comment examines how one of Mercosur's purposes,
along with other multilateral or unilateral trade agreements, is to effectuate and to develop
formidable bargaining power that will be adverse to the interests of the United States. This
comment next addresses the forces presently shaping a possible Chilean accession to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and how Chile's associate membership
in Mercosur and its bilateral trade agreement with Canada both complicates and facilitates
accession.
Section II outlines recent fast-track developments in Congress and the effect this delay
has on both the U.S. economy and its export industry. Furthermore, this section reviews
the United States' role and influence in the future FTAA. Section III introduces Mercosur
and outlines its irreconcilable differences with the NAFTA's provisions and interests.
Section IV examines the recent Chilean accession to associate status in Mercosur and how
this trade alignment may have attenuated Chilean NAFTA accession. Section V discusses
the nature and effect of the recent Canada-Chile bilateral trade agreement, with an emphasis on provisions the two countries were able to successfully negotiate--concessions not
likely to be easily negotiated with the United States. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions on
the effects of NAFTA modeling in hemispheric trade agreements, which may be shadowed,
if not outrightly superseded, by Mercosur's blitz tactics. These tactics may eventually overshadow U.S. interests and promote Mercosur's singular interests as it leads the pack to the
eventual formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.

J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Class of 1999; Staff Editor, Inteinational Law
Review Association of SMU.
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I. "The Future of the World Trading System will be Largely Determined
in Congress Over the Next Few Months."'
A.

INTRODUCTION.

During the last decade, the United States transformed its economic involvement in
Latin America from economic and/or military aid to trade. 2 This shift was based on the
premise that trade is not only beneficial to all parties, but, more importantly, is sustainable over the long haul.3 Indeed, if the nations of this hemisphere continue this trend,
they will stimulate considerable economic growth that will raise the standard of living of
Latin Americans. 4 Therefore, this decade's introduction of the NAFTA effectively
demonstrated U.S. commitment to the concept that open markets constitute the best
means to increase prosperity for all nations of the Americas. 5

In addition, the recent increase in globalization of economies and the internationalization of trade further requires all countries to entertain and to become part of trade
agreements. 6 These agreements lead to the formation of regional, as well as global, trading blocs. 7 In response, the principal goal of hemispheric economic integration was
introduced at the Summit of the Americas in 1994, and was further promoted by an
agreement to negotiate for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by the year 2005.8
However, central to the present state of trade agreements is the issue of fast-track

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Fred Bergstein, American Politics, GlobalTrade, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 23.
Charles Dusseau, Fast-Track or Slow Pitch?,WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 96-98.

Id.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregogy W. Bowman, Economic Intergration in the Americas: "AWork in
Progress", 14 J. INTL.L. & Bus. 493,495 (1994).
Dusseau, supra note 2. Any consideration of this sort, however, must be secondary to U.S. interests because the United States cannot afford to turn its back on these opportunities. Prepared
Testimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc: HearingBefore the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade (1992). Clearly demonstrating the importance of trade,
U.S. exports for 1996 totaled $849 billion, of which $612 billion accounted for goods and the rest
for services. Id. Furthermore, total export and import trade accounted for over $1.8 trillion dollars in business activity-a very significant 24% of the total U.S. economy. Id.To maintain and

increase this figure, foreign markets must be courted across the globe. Id.
6.

7.
8.

Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of NationalIntellectual Property Norms in
InternationalTradingAgreements, 12 AM. UJ. INT'L L.& PoL'Y 769, 770 (1997). The recent concomitant tumbling of both the U.S. and the Asian stock markets indicates how much world
economies are presently intertwined. Rep. Philip Crane, Fast-track Keeping America on the right
path, THE HILL, Nov. 5, 1997, at 22.
Hicks, supranote 6, at 770.
Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas, LAw & PoucY INT'L Bus., June 22,1996, at 945.

Winter 1998

139

authority.9 Nevertheless, although free hemispheric trade is undeniably good for the
United States, both Democrats and Republicans are "so paralyzed by their minority
wings that [free trade] might elude us.' 10
Several reasons account for the lack of support for fast-track authority. First,
Congress is not pressured to move ahead with fast-track because the American public does
not recognize the importance of trade to the future economy.II Second, politicians are not
forthright in their support for fast-track because no matter what side they support, "[they]
are going to get bashed.' 12 Clearly, "these politicians aren't stupid-you might as well wait
as long as you can before getting bashed." 13 For example, some members of the GOP
avoid free trade due to Pat Buchanan and his followers. 14 The Democrats, for their part,
avoid the issue of free trade because they previously alienated facets of their urban support
by endorsing welfare reform. 15 Moreover, some Democrats will not commit to support
fast-track authority unless the executive promises a firm commitment to adequate environmental and labor protection. 16 Concomitantly, the U.S. AFL-CIO extensively lobbied
the Democratic party to insist on labor provisions in future trade agreements, with the
intent of protecting U.S. jobs. 17 In addition, the U.S. AFL-CIO funded and cooperated
with its Chilean counterpart, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, for a general anti-fasttrack demonstration that occurred in November 1997 in Santiago, Chile. 18 These factors
make it dear that legislators from both parties seem reluctant to open commercial markets, deeming such action as threatening to national sovereignty by benefiting only large
corporations while jobs are transferred to lower-priced labor markets. 19
Other reasons why a concerted effort in passing fast-track failed to materialize involve
a trend of "Congressional independence, fractiousness, and indifference on foreign policy

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Fast-track authority expedites congressional approval of Executive branch negotiated trade
agreements, with Congress retaining the right of final approval and to implement whatever legislation is necessary to accommodate the agreement. Economic Research Service, Agricultural outlook- PartII of III, M2 PRisswiaR, Oct. 24, 1997. This authority is generally intended to expedite
international agreements, thereby reassuring foreign governments that negotiations will be ratified or not. Id. Further, it also dispenses with the inevitable squabbling in Congress that, in the
normal legislative process, would necessarily alter agreements. Id.
Barbara Bowie-Whitman, U.S. Hurt byfoot dragging, J.OF COM., Oct. 24, 1997, at 7A.
Id.
Elizabeth Bryant, State, Lawmakers Split Over FastTrack, STATES NEws SERV., Oct. 17,1997.
Id.
Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10, at A7.
Id.
Abid Aslam, Trade-U.S.: Clinton on FastTrack to Nowhere?,INTER. PRESS. SERV., July 25, 1997.
Chile Stays Cool About "Fast-Track"to NAFTA, LATIN AM. REG'L REPORTS: SOUTHERN CONE, Oct. 7,
1997, at 1.
Id.
Trade-Finance:U.S. Delays Release of NAFTA Review, INTER. PRESS. SERV., July 4,1997.
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matters" that followed the end of the Cold War.20 Moreover, 40 percent of the Senate and
a majority of the House were elected since the fall of the Berlin Wall-a telltale sign that
21
"this is a generation of lawmakers that has not had world affairs on the radar screen:
Accordingly, the Clinton administration postponed the November fast-track vote in the
House of Representatives due to justifiable concerns that the bill was likely to be defeated. 22 In this decision, the President received scant support from his own party, even
though he ironically had solid support from the Republicans. 23 Nevertheless, this
November victory for fast-track opponents, lead by Congressman Richard Gephart, outlines the nascent forces of "isolationism and protectionism. 24 Moreover, this defeat comes
at a time when the United States is looked to for global leadership, and sadly "invites com" 25
parisons to the 1930's.
Therefore, as far as international trade is concerned, "what one has, at best, is an
unstable America, an inward-looking America.' 26 Moreover, the postponement of a fasttrack vote until next year further complicates its passing, due to scheduled House elections-a fact that creates even more pressure from the representative's districts to place
27
local interests ahead of national ones.
The question then becomes: how did the president fail to secure the requisite votes
from his own party? A partial answer is complacency in assuming the votes would come
around as they had in 1993 when the NAFTA was ratified. 28 Thus, it is clear the President
does not have a single "buddy" in Congress. 29 Some commentators equate this to a personality fault of the President, since he does not seem to create these types of
relationships. 30 Further complicating the rift between the President and his own party has
been the departure of key personnel crucial in relaxing tensions with the Democrats-31
Thanks to
people like Harold M. Ickes, George Stephanopoulos, and Leon E.Panetta.
their departure, no one remained in the White House who could relate to both organized

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

James Kitfield, Opponents Gave Short Shrift to ForeignPolicy, THE NAT'L J., Nov. 1, 1997, at 2193.
Id.
If He Walks Like a Lame Duck..., ECONOMIST, U.S. ed., Nov. 15, 1997, at 25.
Id. In this last round, the President had mustered 160 of the 228 Republican votes, but only 45 of
the 205 Democratic votes. Id. Unfortunately for the President, approximately 25 crucial conservative Republican votes were to be had only in exchange for Clinton imposing sanctions on antiabortion restrictions in American foreign aid-something he refused to do. Id.
Alan Toulin, Is the Lid Fallingon Free Trade?: Clinton's Inability to Get Fast Track Authority in
Trade Talks Could Signal the End of an Era,FIN. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at 14.
James K, Glassman, House Retreats to its Anti-Trade Cave; "FastTrack" Loss Takes U.S.Back to
Dark Days of 1929, ARiz. REPuBuc, Nov. 13, 1997, at B9.
Toulin, supra note 24.
If He Walks Like a Lame Duck..., supranote 22, at 25.
Id.
John M. Broder & Lizette Alvarez, DemocratsSound Like a Couple in Need of Therapy,N. Y.TIMES,
Nov. 15,1997, at All.
Id.
Id. Specifically, Mr. Ickes had longtime ties to organized labor and Mr. Stephanopoulos had close
ties to Richard Gephart. Id
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labor and the liberal wing of the House Democrats. 32 Nevertheless, the President will not
only strive to resubmit fast-track legislation in early 1998, but is also convinced he will
have a "working majority" in the House of Representatives as long as he presents a "good
33
proposal."
Regardless of Congress' domestic stalemate, the international trade agreement fever
rushes ahead with or without the United States. Indeed, "some nations, especially our
competitors in Europe and Asia, hope the U.S. never shows up at all:' 34 For example, the
European Community (EU) scheduled a trade summit with Mercosur, set for 1999.35 In
addition, the EU launched trade talks anticipated to condude in bilateral trade agreements
not only with Chile, but also with Mexico. 36 Indeed, the sentiment expressed by French
President Chirac during a visit to Latin America, was that Latin America should look to

Europe for leadership, not toward the United States. 37 This sentiment is further made
clear since (aside from Brazil's protectionist tendencies) Mercosur is dearly acting as a
38
bloc, as opposed to the NAFTA, which is a loose federation.
Aside from the encroachment of the world, there is another crucial reason why fasttrack should be ratified. If the United States arrives at the Presidential Summit in Chile in
March 1998 without fast-track authority, the United States hemispheric trading partners

will likely believe that once again the U.S. is withdrawing from the creation of the FrAA.
Since the FTAA was initially a U.S. initiative, the possibility that the United States would
withdraw amounts to "a devastating loss of credibility" 39 Worse than that, however, is that

32. Id.
33. Clinton Tries to ReassureLatin America on FastTrack Bill, NAT'L J.CONGRESS DAILY, Nov. 14,1997.
34. Dusseau, supra note 2, at 96-98. It is ironic that Latin American market potential and power is
often overlooked. Edward Schumacher, Clinton Fumbles an AmericanAlliance, WALL ST. J., May 7,
1997, at A18. Specifically, Latin America receives 18% of U.S. exports, making it the U.S.'s fastest
growing export market. Furthermore, note that Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina's economies
respectively and approximately correspond to China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Accordingly, the
European Union is proposing a trade agreement with Mercosur, and Japan and China have dispatched trade delegations to court the Mercosur economies. Economic Research Service:
Agriculturaloutlook-PartII of III,supra note 9.
35. Kitfield, supra note 20, at 2193.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Clash Between the Mercosurand NAFTA, LATIN AM. REG. REP.: MEX. AND NAFrA REPORT, Oct
10, 1996, at 1.
39. Jim Lobe, US.-Americas: Washington's Uncertain Trumpet on Trade, INTER. PRESS. SERV., May 13,
1997. The United States will, of course, have some influence even if it "sits out" the next few
years, but Congress must take note that the key stipulations on the scope and nature of the FTAA
will be made before the end of the century. David A.Gantz, The United States and the Expansion
of Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Participantor Observer?, 14 ARiz. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 381, 407
(1997). A note on the trade surplus: a plausible theory explains the trade surplus as fueled by
foreign states' need for hard U.S. currency, which therefore makes them more willing to sell products at a lower price. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Worried about the Trade Deficit? Don't be-the Link to
U.S. Job Loss, Lower Wages and Unemployment Isn't There, ROLL CALL, Oct. 20, 1997. Further, U.S.
negotiators lacking authority cannot protect or further U.S. interests, especially if a homogeneous
and undivided Latin American Mercosur is what those negotiators can expect on the other side
of the table. Gantz, supra note 39, at 406. Notably, President Clinton delayed his October 1997
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the United States will be remiss in not properly preparing for the economy of the twenty40
first century.
WHAT Is THE ECONOMIC REALITY THAT HASTENS THE APPROVAL OF FAST-TRACK
AuTHORITY?
Regardless of fast-track authority, the economic and financial integration of the
Western Hemisphere will proceed at its current "break neck speed."41 President Clinton
recently talked about the importance of fast-track by stating: "The economy down here
[South America) is on a fast track. I can see it all around me. They are not waiting for us
to do this [fast-track authority]7 42 Further pressing for an immediate approval of fasttrack is the fact that there are presently more than thirty bilateral and regional trade agreements in this hemisphere. 43 Of these agreements, the NAFTA is the only one to which the
United States belongs. 44 Indeed, no misconception should exist as to how serious the
Mercosur economies are willing to promote their well being. As an example of this
resolve, Mercosur recently began a dialogue on the designation of a singular currency,
much like that proposed for the European Union. 45 This leads to the natural condusion
B.

40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.

visit to Latin America, hoping for fast-track approval. Mark Suzman, Clinton Set on Fast-Track
for Trade Deals, Latin American Trip Reinforces President'sDetermination to PursueIssue in
Congress, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at 5. During this trip the President "sought to distract attention from the lack of progress on fast-track in Washington by praising the region's progress in
spreading democracy, and emphasizing new business and trade opportunities that could be pursued before new trade agreements were reached." Id.
Rep. Jim Kolbe, NAFTA and the expansion offree trade: Currentissues andfutureprospects 'A view
from capitol hill.," 14 ARIz. J.INT'L & COMP. LAw 291,294 (1997).
PreparedTestimony of Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, President,Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd.,
Before the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy
and Trade. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free
Trade Area of the Americas?, FED. NEws SERV., June 11, 1997. Furthermore, Mercosur's free
trade zone agreement with the Andean Community may be signed by the end of 1997-a trade
bloc which will effectively account for 70 percent of South America's economy. Mercosur,
Andean Community Reportedly to Form Free Trade Zone, BBC, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Sept. 2, 1997.
Remarks by the Presidentin Television Town Hall, M2 PRESSWIRE, (M2 Communications Ltd.),
Oct. 27, 1997. Furthermore, aside from Canada's bilateral trade agreement with Chile, Mexico is
currently negotiating a partial preference agreement with Mercosur. Blanco Hails Free Trade in
Americas, THE NEws, Oct. 20, 1997.
Economic Research Service:AgriculturalOutlook-PartII of lL,
supranote 9.
Id
Argentine PresidentAddresses Brazilian Senate on importance of Mercosur, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 13, 1997.
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that the Mercosur economies will further "reconcile exchange and fiscal policies, and longterm interest rates, and attain a debt-GDP balance: 46 All of which is good for Mercosur,
but may not be in the best interest of the United States.
In addition, the free trade that could be taking place now, provided the Executive
branch had negotiating power, is crucial because free and fair trade benefits the "most efficient" economy.47 Thus, it is the United States that would reap the benefits of free trade. 48
This is due to the United States having the most advanced technology, as well as the highest skilled and educated workforce in the hemisphere.49 Furthermore, U.S. competitiveness and efficiency make it the strongest economy in the world due to last decade's extensive industrial restructuring, corporate downsizing, and "budgetary belt-tightening: 5°
With the preceding in mind, the issue of fast-track can best be understood by considering two important developments. The first development is in the context of the
present race to secure hemispheric, multilateral, or unilateral preferential trade agreements that will eventually culminate in the forthcoming Free Trade Area of the
Americas. Second, fast-track can be understood in terms of the possible Chilean accession to the NAFTA.
First, we see fast-track in the context of hemispheric integration in which the lack of
executive authority is "negatively affecting the ability of the United States to shape the
agenda for a Free Trade Area of the Americas."5 1 Indeed, other nations of this hemisphere
formed common markets to emulate the success of "our internal market"-the strength of
which diminishes as the Latin trade blocs grow and as preferential trade agreements are
ratified. 52 Thus, the U.S's economic role in this hemisphere "is being defined by every
53
other nation with any economic sense, except our own.'
The basic consideration surrounding fast-track involves the simple fact that foreign
governments are reluctant to expend any effort to negotiate trade agreements that are subject to amendment by Congress. 54 However, fast-track is not something new. Fast track
has been used since 1974 to negotiate every international trade agreement 55 Thus, for
more than two decades Congress has delegated this authority to the executive branch.
However, it is not accurate to interpret this power as anything other than a shared duty of

46. Id.

47. Grassley, supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. 1d.
50. Rep. Jim Kolbe, Debunking Fast-TrackFear-Mongers: They are the 1990's Xenophobic Version of
the "Know-NothingParty,"ROLL CALL,Oct. 20, 1997.
51. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond- Does the Road Lead to a FutureFree Trade Area of

the Americas?, supranote 41.
52. Bowie-Whitman, supranote 10.
53. Dusseau, supranote 2.
54. Clinton Delays Fast-Track Trade Plan:Renewal of President'sAuthority Seen Crucialfor U.S. Trade
Position,CHEM. MARKEr REP., Sept. 15, 1997, at 3.
55. PreparedTestimony of Jerry Haar,Senior Research Associate and Director,Inter-American Business
and Labor Program,North-South Center at the University of Miami before the House International
Relations Comm., FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 17, 1997.
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both bodies and not, as some would suggest a naked grab for power by the'Executive
branch in disregard to Congress. 56 But, a victory for those opposing fast-track could result
in serious economic consequences. 57 However, an important key to passing this executive
authority may lie in distancing negotiating authority from its association with the
NAFTA.5 8 Thus, for example, when critics argue that jobs go south with trade agreements
like the NAFTA or with possible fast-track authority, they should concomitantly take into
account the jobs that are going south because fast-track has not passed. 59
There are numerous examples of how business opportunities are being lost because
fast-track has not been approved. First in line is Catepillar, Inc. 60 Catepillar is establishing a factory in Brazil to produce heavy machinery and equipment for export to Chile. 61
The reason is that products manufactured in Brazil receive preferential treatment by the
Mercosur signatories, and thus are phased out from an 11 percent Chilean tariff-an
advantage that will not apply to U.S. companies based outside the Mercosur trade bloc. 62
Similarly, Stupp Corporation, a Louisiana based company, lost a $100 million contract to
an Argentine company to export pipe destined for an Argentine-Chilean pipeline because
of a 27 percent Mercosur imposed tariff.63 In addition, several multinational companies
like IBM, Southwestern Bell, and McDonald's are planning to source equipment from
Canada or Mexico (instead of the United States) because these two countries, which coincidentally comprise two-thirds of the NAFTA pack, already have preferential trade agree-

56. Id.
57. Bergstein, supra note 1. Asian and Latin American markets, heavily dependent on the American
market, might further defensive actions. Ia In addition, both China and Russia may lose interest
in further liberalization -- a move that would effectively stall a long history of globalization. Id.
58. Id. The strongest anti-NAFTA protectionist factions include the textile, apparel, and agricultural
industries. Id. Furthermore, anti-dumping and process protectionism are fiercely defended by
lobbyists. Id.
59. Schumacher, supra note 34. The CEO of Quaker Fabric Corporation in Fall River, Massachusetts,

faced the reality that access to the Chilean market costs his company 11% more than his

60.
61.
62.
63.

Canadian or Mexican counterparts. Amy Borrus, Business is in a Hurryfor Fast-Track,Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 15, 1997. Consequently, if Quaker Fabric Corporation could have access to the rest of Latin
America, "as we do in Mexico, we could increase sales 15%, adding close to 300 people," at the
U.S. plant. Id
Schumacher, supra note 34.
Id.
Id. Other companies likely to follow Catepillar's lead include Eastman Kodak and General
Electric. Id.
Paul Blustein, Making a case for South America; White House PreparesArguments on Trade in
Advance of Clinton,WASH. PosT, Oct. 12,1997, at A32.
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ments with Chile. 64 A further example is Sherwin Williams' purchase of the Chilean company, Pinturas Andinas S.A., a move designed solely to "strengthen [its] position in the
Mercosur market. 65 In simple words, companies like these and others, such as Coca Cola,
General Electric, and Eastman Kodak, are all presented with an option--export jobs or
66
lose entire markets.
Another rallying cry from opponents of fast-track is that a bigger trade deficit, along
with an associated loss of jobs and lower wages for Americans, is what we can expect from
further trade liberalization. 67 However, U.S. history and comparative studies show a lack
of correlation between these variables. 68 It is time opponents to fast-track stop using isolated incidents of contaminated strawberries grown in Mexico, but processed in the United
69
States, to give a bad reputation to all foreign products.
In this light, one can begin to see what the United States is up against with Brazil and
Argentina. In the last seven years, Brazil's economy streamlined from an astonishing 1,600
percent inflation to a respectable 5 percent. 70 Furthermore, Brazil's imports from the
United States almost doubled in the last five years to almost $11.6 billion. 7 1 Similarly,
72
Argentina also doubled its imports from the United States to about $4.1 billion.
The second context under which fast-track can be explored is in terms of Chilean
accession to the NAFTA. Chilean accession is discussed below; however, as an introduc-

64. Schumacher, supra note 34. Furthermore, the NAFTA really has not done too bad; the Council
of the Americas recently released a study that revealed that of 21 U.S. states, nine have experienced a 40% increase in exports to Canada and Mexico since the NAFTA was enacted, while
another seven have seen a 30% increase. Id. In California alone, the California World Trade
Commission estimates that exports to Mexico sustain more than 125,000 jobs, of which 25,000
resulted in 1995 alone. Id. On the other hand, the first couple of years of the NAFTKs inancy
were rough due to the peso crisis in Mexico and the subsequent recession the peso crisis caused.
However, in comparison to a similar situation in the early eighties, Mexico bounced back "much
more quickly than they did when.. .there was no NAFTA" Remarks by the Presidentin Television
Town Hall, supra note 42.
65. Regional Update: Chile-Sherwin-WilliamsPaintsthe Town, LuxER NEws INC., July 1, 1997.
66. Paul Magnusson, Commentary: Why Washington Mustn't Stop Now., Bus. WEEK, April 21, 1997.
For example, IBM of Chile imports $35 million yearly in tariff free PCs from Mexico, which it
would build domestically if it weren't for the 11% tariff. Id.
67. Grassley, supranote 39.
68. Id. For example, in 1975 unemployment was 8.5%. However, this was the last year the United
States held a trade surplus. 1996 saw a trade deficit of $114 billion, yet an unemployment rate of
just 5%. Id. Similarly, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden all have had trade surpluses for the
last 15 years, yet their unemployment rates have repeatedly totaled between 7 and 9%. Id.
69. Kolbe, supra note 50.
70. William Douglas, Clinton's Southern Strategy/Lacking Pact, He Brings Gifts to S. America,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 1997, at A07.
71. Id.
72. Id. For both countries, exports to the United States have been pale in comparison to imports. Id.
Brazil and Argentina respectively exported $8.1 and $1.9 billion to the United States. Id.
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tion, Chile is a great choice for NAFTA expansion for many reasons. 73 First, Chile has
become a strong economy with an average annual increase in gross national product of 6
percent for the last decade. 74 Furthermore, Chile has a good record on labor and environmental issues. 75 Moreover, Chilean accession can only benefit the United States because it
including fertilizer, autois Chile that has to eliminate tariffs on competitive U.S. exports,
76
mobiles, agriculture, telecommunications, and chemicals.
C. WILL THE FTAA BE MORE LKE THE NAFrA OR MERCOSUR.
As stated above, the United States is committed to free trade in the Americas by the year
2005. The path this trade area will take is not as dear as the date on which it will take form.
It is clear that in the formation of this bloc the U.S. may lose an opportunity to lead the agenda for trade integration not only in this hemisphere, but around the world--something that
is "dearly not in U.S. interest."77 Thus, the United States' role as leader in trade relations with
the sole region of the world in which it sustains a trade surplus is in jeopardy.78 This occurs
while singular countries jockey to further their own economic objectives. 79 Regardless, successful creation and implementation of any hemispheric integration plan or agreement
requires a substantial amount of time, effort, and political will. 80 In addition, the formation
of the FTAA requires participation by the United States, since it comprises the largest export
and import market for most of Latin America.8 1 Furthermore, while fast-track is not necessary to begin negotiations, it is crucial to the conclusion of any agreement.82 In summary, if
a FTAA is to ever solidify, U.S. involvement is required, 83 as "there's no way to accomplish
this without the leadership of the biggest market in the world.' 84
To buy time, the United States calculated several measures. For example, a part of the
strategy may lie in "atomizing" Mercosur with respect to FTAA negotiations.8 5 Chile's
Foreign Minister, Jose Miguel Insuza, described this practice as "a policy from the 1950's,
when they though they could give us each a candy and keep us divided, things are different

73. PreparedTestimony of Jerry Haar,Senior Research Associate and Director,Inter-American Business
and Labor Program,North-South Center at the University of Miami, before the HouseInternational
Relations Comm., supranote 55.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id
77. White House Briefing National Press Club Morning Newsmaker with Thomas McLart, White
House Special Envoy for the Americas; Re: the President's Upcoming Trip to South America, FED.
NEws SERv., Oct. 10, 1997.

78. Dusseau, supranote 2.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 512.
Kevin G. Hall, Fast-TrackTrouble PutsHemisphere in Turmoil J. oF CoMm., Nov. 12,1997, at 5A.
Kitfield, supra note 20.
Id
Id.
Marcela Valente, Trade-Mercosur: Bloc Resists "Dissolving" into FTAA, INTErPREss SERv., Oct. 13,
1997.
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now.' 86 Atomizing Mercosur may indeed be designed to create internal competition and
tension.8 7 An example of internal strife, which has been also described as "meddling politically," includes offering F- 16 fighters to Chile.88 This offer effectively lifts a twenty year89
old U.S. embargo on such arms.
While the United States offers something to Chile, it also offers something to
Argentina. What the United States offered Argentina was status as non-NATO ally-an
offer Chile has not taken lightly.90 This alliance, which gives Argentina access to surplus
U.S. arms is also interpreted as hostile by Brazil.9 1 The United States, however, is billing
Argentina's non-NATO ally status as recognition for Argentina's "role and participation in
international peacekeeping." 92 In addition, a final atomizing tactic involves Brazil's desire
for a seat on the 93United Nation's Security Council, something Argentina, among others,
will not approve.
In contrast, Latin American countries have their own dynamic ideas in the construction of hemispheric trade. For example, inflated sentiment in some countries such as
Chile furthers the belief that the only way to confront the United States in free trade agreement negotiations is "through a large [tradelbloc' 94 Thus, for example, Chile could significantly increase its negotiating power against the United States as a part of a Mercosur
led FTAA. 95 In addition, Brazil, as the leading power of Mercosur, proposed gradual negotiations for a FTAA with no deadlines. 96 The United States, on the other hand, is pressing
for tariff reduction negotiations as soon as 1998. 97 In short, Latin American sentiment
toward the United States can easily be interpreted as cold in that "the U.S. is trying to herd
us into this thing [FTAA] like the buffaloes in the [wild west], and just like those buffaloes,
if we allow it, we will be heading for extinction.' 98

86. Slow Track to Fast-Track; Clinton Administration'sPush for Fast-Track Authorization of Trade
Deals,ECONOMIST, Sep. 13, 1997, at 33.
87. Valente, supra note 85.

88. William Pfaff, Don't Forget That Globalization CreatesLosers, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 13,
1997, at 8.
89. Id.
90. Valente, supra note 85. This is a move that Chileans fear will upset the regional balance of power.
Suzman, supranote 39.
91. Pfaff, supranote 88.
92. Special While House Briefing with Sandy Berger, National Secutiry Adviser to the Presidentand
Mack McLarty, the President'sSpecial envoy for the Hemisphere FED. NEws SERv., Oct. 7, 1997.

93. Valente, supranote 85.
94. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile & Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Report, LATIN AM.
WKLY REP., July 15, 1997, at 330.

95. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in Any Future Negotiations Between Mercasur
and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 14 ARi.. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 306
(1997).
96. Valente, supranote 85.
97. I& Indeed, the U.S strategy has been stated to include forging the "greatest possible space for
placing its products in the rest of the countries in the continent," while at the same time seeking
"to curb the proliferation of successful blocs like MERCOSUR." Id.
98. Anthony Faiola, Brazilians Wary of U.S. trade Pact, Businesses Fear Dropped Barriers Could
Damage Recovering Economy, WASH. PoST, Oct. 16,1997, at A24.
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To complicate matters, although the prevailing idea about the FTAA is that it must
necessarily amalgamate the NAFTA and Mercosur, it is probable that both blocs will have
to contend with a strong third player, the Andean Pact 99 Furthermore, even if no fasttrack opposition existed in the United States, Mercosur and particularly Brazil already

form a formidable economic unit with notable negotiating power.100 This power derives
from the extent of integration within Mercosur and its relative size in relation to Latin
America. 10 1 Nonetheless, Mercosur will likely use the November postponement of fasttrack to step up its negotiations with the Andean Pact and the Central American Common
Market, to effectively increase their negotiating power. 102 Furthermore, just as the AFLCIO wants binding resolutions on labor, thereby opposing fast-track, the lack of fast-track
will open the door for the agenda proposed by Mercosur-an agenda that is far less favor03
able to workers' rights.'
Finally, Mercosur's push to expand into the rest of Latin America with a series of
Mercosur-Chile type agreements will further strengthen Mercosur's go slow approach. 1° 4
This approach seems forced on Brazil, for example, because local companies are not modern enough for global competitiveness.105 Furthermore, heavy taxation by the Brazilian
government also lessened the possibility of Brazilian domestic business competing against
the United States. 106 Nonetheless, the U.S. would like to accelerate the go-slow approach
and would ideally like the FTAA to start by the year 2000.107 This comes at a time when
the United States enjoys economic strength not affected by the business cycle.' 08 The
attenuation of the business cycle must be comprehended in terms of international trade,
since it constitutes expanded production and efficiency as a mechanism to keep a check on
inflation. 109 Accordingly, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman, stated that
"import provid[es] a safety valve in a U.S. economy marked by a high degree of resource
utilization.' 110 Thus, the expansion of international markets is the reason the internation-

99. Gantz, supra note 39, at 405. Recently, the Andean Pact (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Bolivia) designated a secretary general and also amended the agreement to include the formation of both a parliament and a court of justice in the next five years. Id. Nonetheless,
Mercosur and the Andean Pact expect to have a negotiated agreement by the end of 1997.
Andean, LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MEx. &NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4.
100. Bernal, supra note 8.
101. Id. For example, Mercosur represents 50% of Latin America's GDP, 40% of its population, and a
third of its foreign trade. Id.
102. Hall, supra note 81.
103. Adrienne Fox, Are Free-TradeDeals on Hold?,INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al.
104. Gantz, supra note 39. The "go slow" approach will allow Mercosur (a.ka., Brazil's interests) to
form closer ties with the rest of Latin America. Id. Furthermore, Brazil has demonstrated a desire
to drag its feet in market access negotiations unless the United States is willing to improve its
market access for Brazilian products (orange juice, textiles, footwear, tobacco, sugar, and steel).
Id.
105. Faiola, supranote 98.
106. Id.
107. The Clash Between the Mercosur andNAFTA, supranote 38.
108. Dusseau, supra note 2.
109. Id.
110. Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10.
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al business sector is a key component in the current bullish U.S economy.111
Furthermore, U.S. exports continue to rise and exports are a major driving force in
the creation of jobs and economic growth in the United States.11 2 On the other hand, the
criticism that only large companies benefit from trade is not true. 113 Indeed, small and
medium sized companies play a significant role in exports both in their own right and also
provide products and services to large exporting companies. 114 Ninety-five percent of
U.S. exporters are small and medium sized companies, of which three-fourths employ less
than fifty people, experience fewer closings, and grow jobs at a faster rate.115 With this in
mind, it is important to note that United States can only benefit by equalizing tariff rates
with Latin American countries. 116 Since U.S. tariffs presently average around 3 percent,
while Latin American tariffs average around 12 percent,
any treatment of trade with Latin
7
America must initially benefit the United States."
The importance of trade is also explained in terms of the success of the NAFTA." 8
This is because in 1996 the NAFTA increased real exports to Mexico by $12 billion, with a
concomitant real increase in imports of $5 billion-figures due to a five fold reduction of
Mexican tariffs as compared to the United States whose tariff's were much lower to begin
with. 119 Furthermore, imports contribute to price stability and exports contribute to
growth. 120 In addition, with growth rates approximating 5 percent, Latin American countries like Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and even Mexico can and will want to buy U.S.
exports. 12 1 This fact, of course, has not escaped the attention of our neighbors in Asia.
Indeed, the International Monetary Fund states that trade between Asia and Latin
American has grown for the last three years at a rate of 27-40 percent. 122 Thus, Latin

111. Dusseau, supranote 2.

112. PreparedTestimony ofJoseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. Specifically, US. total economic growth as
a whole has been outpaced by growth in the export industry. Id. Furthermore, 1996 growth in
U.S. GDP was a mere 2.4% compared to real terms exports of goods and services of 6.5%. Id.
113. Id.

114. Id. Export figures from 1992 reveal that small and medium sized companies with fewer than
500 employees accounted for $109 billion in goods exports, which in turn accounts for 29%
of total U.S. exports of goods. Id. Furthermore, export related jobs accounted for one-eighth
of net jobs created in 1992-1996, and presently account for 10% of civilian positions and
20% of manufacturing jobs. Id. (Exports currently support a total of 11 million jobs in the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

U.S.) Grassley, supra note 39. In addition, not only do export-related jobs pay 13% more
than the average U.S. wage, but jobs supported by exports pay 20% more than the average
U.S. wage. Id. The above does not even take into account the benefits to service providers like
banks and insurance companies. Id.
William M. Daley, Trade Is a Pocketbook Issue, J. oF Comm., Nov. 5, 1997, at 6A.
Magnusson, supra note 66.
Id.
Abid Aslam, Trade: Clinton DeclaresNAFTA a Winner,INTERPRFs. SERv., July 11, 1997.
Id.
Bowie-Whitman, supra note 10.
Id.
Stephanie Noecker, Survey says... "Si': Bus. MEX., Nov. 1,1997.
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The United States should not ignore this fact.

As it relates to Latin America, a Mercosur led Latin American trade bloc may actually
facilitate the ultimate goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 124 Mercosur serves to
resolve "problems that inevitably result from attempts to integrate economies that are vastly different in size and development on a much more manageable, sub-regional level where
the disparities tend to be less stark." 125 Another advantage of a strong Mercosur is its
function as an effective negotiating counterweight that may force the United States to
26
eliminate anti-dumping measures and other deleterious protectionist policies.1
Nevertheless, a failure by the U.S. Congress to pass fast-track authority may mean
weak bargaining power in formation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 127 While
opponents of the NAFTA equate fast-track only in the context of the NAFTA, fast-track is
not NAFTA!" 128 The agreements that may evolve from fast-track will encompass Latin
123. Id.
124. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?,supranote 41.
125. Id As noted in the manner by which pressure was exerted on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay to attenuate the threat of a coup d'etat FTAA to be associated historically with Clinton,
GAZETA MERCANTL ONLINE, Oct. 24,1997.
126. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free TradeArea of
the Americas?,supranote 41.
127. Id. On the other hand, in the United States, $480 million are lost every year that Chilean NAFTA
accession is delayed because of the existence of an 11% tariff on all goods originating in the U.S.
Regional Update, Chile--AMCHAM: NAFTA Exclusion Hurts U.S. Business, SourH Am. REPORT,
June 1, 1997.
128. PreparedTestimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade,supra note 5. NAFTA opponents often cite illegal immigration, border environmental disasters and maquilladoras, as undesirable consequences of the
NAFTA. Id. Although the criticisms are not baseless, these problems are specific to Mexico and
are not relevant to trade relations with other countries. Id. Indeed, the critics are strongly backed
by the global competitors that are furiously working to establish trade relations without inviting
the United States. Id. It is crucial to note that, notwithstanding the obvious importance of environmental problems, a trade agreements' purpose is to align trade practices and not to "provide a
disincentive to pollute" Economic Research Service: Agricultural Outlook-PartII of II, supra note
9. Although more difficult, a preferable method to achieve the same environmental end is by
independent environmental agreements. Id For example, Argentina's President Menem recently
stated, "a global problem such as climate change requires a global answer from all countries."
Suzman, supra note 39. Furthermore, in defense of the NAFTA, a July 1997 report stated the following successes of NAFTA:
1) A 36% export growth to Mexico from 1993-96 (boost of real exports increase by
$12 billion in 1996 as compared to a smaller real increase of imports of $5 billion);
2) A 33.6% export growth to Canada from 1993-96;
3) A rapid recovery from the 1995 Mexican Economic crisis;
4) A creation of 90,000 to 160,00 jobs involved in the export industry to Mexico; and
5) Sourcing Mexican apparel products comprised of two-thirds U.S. content (as opposed
to getting similar products from Asia).
Aslam, supra note 118. In addition, another source of support for the NAFTA and its success has
come from a study sponsored by the Council of the Americas. Overview: NAFTA impact on
Texas, California,MEx. Bus. MoNTHLY, Apr. 1, 1997. This study noted that exports from both
Texas and California have risen by 15% under the NAFTA. Id.
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American trade interests that differ sharply from those of the United States. 129 These
diverging interests are demonstrated by Mercosur's treatment ofi telecommunications sys-

tems; media ownership; and participation in financial services; as well as bidding on government procurement contracts to Mercosur nationals. 130 Indeed, these restrictions
granted to Mercosur members coincide with areas in which U.S companies have an international competitive advantage. 31 Thus, the inevitable Free Trade Area of the Americas of
the future may actually lack "the type of market liberalization rules that benefit the most
since
dynamic sectors of the U.S. economy." 132 This realization is even more compelling
133
Mercosur proposed to increase134nonmember import tariffs by 25 percent, which could
reverse hemispheric free trade.
Nonetheless, the question of whether the gradual enlargement of the NAFTA will
someday result in the Free Trade of the Americas is by no means certain- it is more likely
that the FTAA will result from a Mercosur led building blocks approach. 135 Indeed, Brazil,
not the United States, is currently headlining the direction of the FTAA, due to inaction 1by
37
the U.S. 136 More importantly, recent Chilean attitude toward the NAFTA has shifted.
from trade disputes involving Salmon
This attitude change toward the United States stems
138
and a recent court decision on timber products.
D.

THE UNITED STATES' PRESENT ECONOMIC STRENGTHS SHOULD BE PUT TO GOOD USE.

The United States should not falter in furthering our economy at a time when world
agricultural exports grew from over $200 billion in 1980 to over $400 billion in the mid

129. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supranote 41.

130. Id.
131. Id Mercosur, however, has built impossibly high trade barriers, making its markets inaccessible
to products such as motor vehicles and heavy machinery. Mercosur Under Siege, J.CoM., Oct. 31,
1996, at A6. Furthermore, Mercosur is becoming less competitive internationally, because by
eliminating the flow of trade from the most efficient outsiders to each other, it has effectively lost
competitive pressures on domestic producers. Id.
132. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond& Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supranote 41.
133. Hemisphere Closing Down, J. CoM., Nov. 14,1997, at A6.
134. Id.
135. MercosurApproach to FTAA Advances; US. Partnersin NAFTA Seek "Four-Plus-One"Deals, LATIN
AM. WKLY. REP., Aug. 5, 1997, at 364.
136. Dusseau, supra note 2.
137. MercosurApproach to FTAA Advances: U.S. Partnersin NAFTA Seek "Four-Plus-One"Deals, supra

note 135. Jose Miquel Insulza, Chilean Foreign Minister, stated that "Mercosur is our FTA," and
commented that Chile is focusing on complete integration with Mercosur, an interest superseding any interest Chile may have in a deal with the NAFTA. Id.
138. Id. Further complicating the US-Chile relationship is the dreadful "poisoned grapes" fiasco of
1989, an event which cost Chile approximately $300 million dollars. Id.
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1990's. 139 Agriculture is a promising area for the United States because its agricultural
exports increased three-fold over domestic consumption, 140 allowing yield growth and
total demand to remain at the same pace. 14 1 Furthermore, agricultural exports increased
from 18 to 30 percent of gross farm cash receipts, respectively, from 1986 to 1996.142 In
addition, the agricultural industry is two times more reliant on foreign trade than the
143
economy as a whole.
Although opportunities abound in this area, world markets are heavily subsidized and
protected. 44 U.S. inclusion into these markets, however, is supplanted by preferential
trade blocks like Mercosur and bilateral trade agreements like the Canada-Chile agreement. Both of these agreements put national producers at a disadvantage by providing
preferential duty access to member's markets. 145 For example, U.S. agricultural products
bound to Chile face an 11 percent tariff. 146 Again, in this context, failure to provide fasttrack authority undermines growth in this country's agricultural exports, as well as the
well being of its ranchers and farmers. 147 This is especially poignant since the largest U.S.
agricultural trade surplus occurred in 1996.148
Another example of how U.S. products are not able to compete in the Latin American
markets is in the wine industry. For example, American wine producers are not able to
maintain a competitive share in the Venezuelan market because Chile has a bilateral trade

139. PreparedTestimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economist U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; GeneralFarm Commodities Subcommittee, FED. NEws SERv., Oct. 9, 1997. In
addition, the labor department in November announced a 24 year low unemployment figure of
4.7%. Glassman, supra note 25. The U.S. economy, furthermore, is the strongest in the world
with inflation of a mere 2% and growth of 4%. Id. In addition, not only is industrial employment up 7 %, but job creation has produced approximately 200,000 jobs per month since 1992.
Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Economic Research Service AgriculturalOutlook-PartII ofIII, supra note 9.
143. PreparedTestimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade,supra note 5. 1996 alone saw record exports totaling $60
billion (an increase of 7% from 1995 and 50% from 1990). Id. This figure amounts to one of
every three farm acres including 50% of wheat, 57% of rice, and 37% of soybean acres. Id.
144. PreparedTestimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economist, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; GeneralFarm Commodities Subcomm., supranote 139.
145. Id.
146. Economic Research Service: Agriculturaloutlook-Part I of I7, supra note 9.
147. Prepared Testimony of Keith Collins, Chief Economism U.S. Dept. of Agriculture before the House
Agriculture Comm.; GeneralFarm Commodities Subcomm., supranote 139.
148. PreparedTestimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc-, Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade, supra note 5. The agricultural trade surplus for 1996
was $28 billion. Id. Among the trade concerns that the United States will have to negotiate
include: 1) High tariffs, 2) Tariff-rate quotas; 3) Export subsidies; 4) Domestic support; 5) State
trading, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers; and 6) Regional trade agreements. Economic
Research Service: AgriculturalOutlook-Part11 of HI, supra note 9. Indeed, fast-track is needed to
effectively and efficiently negotiate such a wide range of factors. Id.
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agreement with Venezuela and the U.S. does not. 149 This agreement allows Chilean wine
to enter tariff free, while their American counterparts must pay a 20 percent duty. I5 0
Elimination of this tariff could lead to a market share increase from the current 5 percent
151
to over 30 percent.
Thus, it is clear that opening trade relations with Latin American markets (like Chile)
is important not only for mutual gain, but to compete on a level playing field.15 2 The preceding does not consider the weakening effects to the U.S. mining industry due to the
Canada-Chile bilateral free trade agreement that gives preferential treatment to Canadian
mining firms. 153 In conclusion, since Mercosur clearly has a momentum that the NAFTA
does not, 154 at the next hemispheric trade meeting in 1998 the Mercosur led South
American Free Trade Agreement will have formidable negotiating strength against the
155
United States.
E. PRESENT CHILEAN ATTITUDE TowARD TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES.
Although abundant, Latin American reactions to the 1994 Miami Summit were varied. 156 For example, reactions to the Summit included emphasizing protection at home in
order to enhance a strong negotiating position against the United States. 157 As previously
stated, by forming regional trade blocs, Latin American states provided the means to easily
promote hemispheric integration. 158 This is true even though a negative effect of the

149. Schumacher, supranote 34.
150. Id. Another of the seemingly endless examples includes IMC-Agrico Co, a Florida business,
which lost a phosphate fertilizer contract thanks to Chile's bilateral trade agreement with Mexico.
Bryant, supranote 12.
151. Schumacher, supranote 34.
152. The White House: Fact Sheet-U.S. & Chile Trade Relations, M2 PRESSwIRm, Feb. 27, 1997. U.S.
exports to Chile in 1996 totaled $4.1 billion, while imports comprised $2.26 billion for a trade
deficit for Chile to the amount of $1.9 billion. Id.
153. Kevin Hall, Clinton to Get an Earful on Visit to Latin America, J.CoMM., Oct. 10, 1997, at IA.
154. U.S. Trade Policy In Latin America, LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: Max. & NAFTA REP., June 3, 1997, at 1.
Intra-Mercosur trade has exhibited strong growth-from U.S.$4.1 billion in 1990 to U.S.$16.8
billion in 1996. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing, Chile &-Argentina ProvideCounter to NAFTA Repor,
supranote 94. In the same period, trade with non-members increased from U.S.$67.4 billion to
U.S.$124 billion. Id. Under the NAFTA, on the other hand, American companies increased their
exports to Mexico by 35.7%. Overview: Thumbs Up, Down ForNAFTA, MEx. Bus. Mo., Aug. 1,
1997.
155. Id. Brazil, however, has threatened its Mercosur partners by adopting unilateral measures on at
least five occasions. Andean Community Update Mercosur Developments, and Progress Toward a
Free TradeArea of the Americas, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., May 31, 1997. Brazil's faltering economy has furthered such moves. However, although a devaluation of the Real could alleviate its
problems, Mercosur members are sure to oppose such a move because their export deals to Brazil
would not be as profitable. Id,
156. Sebastian Edwards, The Americas: NAFTA Offers Latins Little They Can'tHave Now, WALL ST. J.,
Apr.18, 1997, at A19.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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trade bloc may be trade diversion. 159 Nevertheless, these associations further a crucial step
in the consolidation and maintenance of democratic systems. 160 Thus, Latin Americans
are reluctant to open their markets to the NAFTA on U.S. terms because they believe that a
concomitant export advantage against the United States cannot be materialized. 161 This
reluctance is due to the fact that these economies do not want exposure to market integra162
tion with the more sophisticated and dynamic North American economies.
It is in this environment that Chilean policy-makers became obsessed with NAFTA
accession. 163 As a result, Chile did little to open their economy to the world.164 All of this
is a backdrop to the fact that NAFTA accession cannot be shown to be the preferable route
for Chilean interests, which may be advanced by other means. 165 Furthermore, with
annual growth of 7 percent, Chile is in a strong economic position with or without the
NAFTA. 166 Moreover, with trade as the cornerstone of the Chilean economy, Chile has
unprecedented strength due to sweeping economic and government reforms. 167 In addition, Chilean government officials have expressed a stronger interest in developing free
trade across the Americas than in developing the interests of South America's Mercosur
16 8
customs union.
In this context, the Chilean Finance Minister, Eduardo Aninat, demonstrated past

160. FTAA to be associatedhistorically with Clinton, supra note 125. This effect was tested last year by

the pressure exerted by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to attenuate the threat of a Paraguayan
coup d'etat. Id.
161. Valente, supra note 85.
162. Id.
163. Edwards, supra note 156.
164. Id.

165. Id.

166. Kevin G.Hall, When It Comes to Trade, Chile Makes the Grade, J.CoM., Feb. 26,

1997, at 3A.
167. James Welsh, Investing in Latin American Markets, WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 104-08. The

result has been a significant reduction of Chilean government intervention with business, resulting in modest non-tariff barriers, as well as an imported goods tariff of 6%. Id. However, even a
relatively small tariff is significant to success or failure in foreign markets. Prepared Testimony of
Joseph Gorman, Chairman and CEO of TRW, Ina, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means;
Subcomm. on Trade, supranote 5.
168. Chile Spurns Mercosur, Seeks Americas Free Trade; REUTERS FIN. SERV., May 12, 1997. Indeed,

Mercosur membership has not been welcomed by all sectors of Chilean business-namely the
agricultural industry. Rejected by NAFTA, FreiPursues Deal With MercosurBloc LAIN AM. INFO.

SEv., Mar. 1, 1996. In 1995, meat and rice constituted 30% Uruguay's exports to Chile; concomitantly soy and meat products accounted for up to 53% of Paraguay's exports to Chile. Id.
Similarly, Argentina's meat accounted for exports to Chile of $104 million in 1995. Id. Yet, U.S.
Congress' October 1995 refusal to fast-track the proposed expansion of the NAFrA was a determining factor in Chile's pact with the Mercosur. Gustavo Gonzalez, Economy Chile: Integration
with Latin America's Most Dynamic Bloc, INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 30, 1996.
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confidence in the eventual Chilean accession to the NAFTA.1 69 Presently, Chile has successfully negotiated bilateral trade agreements with two-thirds of the NAFTA triad, and at
least in the short run, is more likely to join the Asian-based APEC than the NAFTA.1 70 In
addition, Chile may choose to strengthen its ties with Mexico, Canada, Mercosur, or other
nation states, 17 1 as it has done with Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.1 72 The preceding is more poignant since the United States only imports 15 percent of Chile's
exports. 173 Most of this figure is made up of copper, which the United States will buy anyway. 174 Furthermore, Chile will not expect any gains from the export of manufactured
goods to the United States, as does Mexico. 175 Chile is primarily interested in the trade of
fish and wants it as a prominent part of any trade agreement. 17 6
Nonetheless, Chile and the United States have tensions that need to be addressed. For
example, Argentina's accession as U.S. special ally produced some tension between Chile
and the United States. 177 In general, however, Chilean sentiment toward the United States
centers on a "change of U.S. protectionist policy' 178 These protectionist policies are
argued to run counter to cooperation and hemispheric integration programs. 179

169. Chile Spurns Mercosur, Seeks Americas Free Trade, supra note 168. The White House's present

position on Chilean accession to the NAFTA, or the development of separate negotiations with
Chile is as follows,"[in o]ur discussions with Chile over the last year or two, we have indicated
that we might be interested in a bilateral arrangement, much as Canada did a bilateral arrangement with Chile. I don't think there's any final decision on that yet, but that possibility hs certainly been discussed, discussed quite seriously, and I think it's one to which the Chileans are

amenable." The White House: PressBriefing by M, McCurry and Dan Taruflo, M2 PREsswIRa, Sept.
18, 1997. According to chapter 22 of the NAFTA: "[any country or group of countries may

accede to this Agreement subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such
country or countries and the Commission and following approval in accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each country" North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12,
1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605,702 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].

170. Dusseau, supra note 2. Santiago, Chile, is poised to become an international financial center by
taking advantage of its of its geographical location as a "bridge" between Mercosur and the Asian
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

markets. Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile: Santiago Seeks Mercosur Role as Bridge to Asia Pacific.,
INTERPREmS SERV., Aug. 5, 1997.
Gantz, supra note 39, at 408.
Slow Track to Fast-Track; Clinton Administration's Pushfor Fast-Track Authorization of Trade
Deals, supra note 86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chile-U.S. Trade PactNearsSigning, INT1RPRESS SE., Aug. 21, 1997. President Clinton conferred

to Argentina the status of "non-NATO military ally" (NNMA) during his Latin America visit in
October 1997. The White House, Press Briefing by Counsel to President, Mack McLarty on
President'sTrip to South America, M2 PR&%SWIRE, Oct. 13, 1997. Although this partnership is cate-

gorized in terms of common interest in peacekeeping, Chileans expressed some concern about it.
Id.
178. Gustavo Gonzalez, Trade: Chilean Right Demands End to U.S. Protectionism., INTERPREss SERV.,
Aug. 5, 1997.
179. Id.
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Accordingly, the Chilean president stated that the 1998 Summit of the Americas is meant
primarily to initiate formal negotiations on the FTAA. 180 In addition, Chilean entrepreneurs are looking toward Mercosur to present a "united front against U.S. protectionism.'1 8 Thus, President Frei stated that the 1998 negotiations "must include, from the
very start, the issues of most interest to our countries, and not only the agenda that the
United States wishes to impose!"182 Furthermore, even though a future bilateral trade
agreement could include crucial environmental provisions, these must reflect Chilean
standards-not those of the United
States. 183 In addition, these provisions must not be
184
enforced with trade sanctions.
Recently, other tensions threatened the U.S.-Chile trading relationship. A primary
tension is an early June 1997 California court ruling barring imports of timber from Chile
on "sanitary grounds.? 185 Subsequently, Portland port authorities unjustifiably refused
entry to Chilean timber actually not affected by the ban. 186 This controversy began in a
San Francisco U.S. District Court by the issuing of an injunction forcing the Department
of Agriculture to develop new rules and a new environmental impact statement. 187 This
injunction effectively barred the Department of Agriculture from issuing new permits for

most foreign imports, exclusive of both Canada and Mexico, as well as tropical imports not
considered to pose pest risks. 188 Nonetheless, the Chilean Foreign Minister Jose Miguel
Insulza optimistically stated that this controversy will not lead to curbs on Chilean
Lumber.189
In addition, Chilean attitudes were further soured by a complaint filed by U.S salmon
producers against Chilean salmon exporters for dumping.' 90 However, Insulza categorized this problem as being at an early stage and downplayed its importance. 19 1 The attitude in Chile went so far as the President of the Industrialist Association suggesting that,

180. Frederico Ferber, Mercosur: Landmark Accord on Political CoordinationMechanism, INTERPRESS
SERv., June 19, 1997.
181. Gustavo Gonzalez, Americas: U.S. Protectionism Undermines FTAA, INTERPRESS SERV., July 15,
1997.
182. Ferber, supra note 180.
183. Slow track to fast-track; ClintonAdministration'sPush for Fast-TrackAuthorization of Trade Deals,
supranote 86.
184. Id.
185. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile & Argentina Provide Counter to NAFTA Report, supra note
94.
186. Id.
The U.S. imports 13% of all
of Chile's timber exports. Id.
187. Hal Bernton, Judges Ruling Blocks Most New Permitsfor Log Imports, PORAND OREGONIAN, June
11, 1997.
188. Id.
189. Richard Lawrence, Chile Open to BilateralPact,But PrefersNAFTA, J.CoM., Sept. 19, 1997.
190. U.S. Policy Takes a Drubbing Chile 6- Argentina ProvideCounter to NAFTA Report supra note 94.
The United States imports 55% of all Chilean salmon exports. Id The complaint was filed by
salmon farmers charging that Chile was undercutting their prices by as much as 40% by subsidizing salmon exports. MarketNotes: Chile-Anti-DumpingComplaintFiled Against Chile, LATIN Am.
L.& Bus. REP., July 31, 1997.
191. Lawrence, supra note 189.
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unless this dispute were satisfactorily resolved, Chile's plan to purchase fighter jets would
192
be called off.
Thus, present Chilean attitude toward the NAFTA can be best classified as distinctively
hostile. 193 All of this just when Chile was finally beginning to leave the "poisoned" grape
incident behind. 194 This refers to the cyanide laced grape incident of 1989, which was
wrongly incited by U.S. Health and Safety inspectors. 195 This mistake effectively destroyed
the Chilean grapes industry and its exports for a year.196 In conclusion,
all of these inci" 197
dents have "bred mistrust of Washington as a NAFTA partner.

II. How Mercosur and NAFTA's Approach to Trade Are Inherently

Divergent.
A.

INTRODUCTION.

198
The basic goals of Mercosur and the NAFTA are for the most part incompatible.
The NAFTA was designed to facilitate the free movement of capital and services among its
member states. 199 In addition, the stated objectives of the NAFTA include the elimination
of both tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in, and the facilitation of cross border movement of goods and services between its members. 200 Furthermore, the NAFTA seeks to
increase investment opportunities, promote fair competition within the area, and to effec20
tively provide not only protection, but also enforcement of, intellectual property rights. '
On the other hand, Mercosur was patterned after the European Union, including a
Common External Tariff (CET) and coordinated macro-economic and sectoral policies. 202 It seeks coordinated macro-economic policies on foreign trade, agriculture, industry, capital, services, customs, transportation, communication, and fiscal, monetary, and
exchange policies.20 3 These lofty goals, however, have been hard to implement due to dif-

192. Slow Track to Fast-Track; Clinton Administration's Push for Fast-Track Authorization of Trade
Deals,supra note 86.
193. Gonzalez, supra note 181.
194. Id.
195. Id.

196. Id.
197. Id.

198. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308. The stated objectives of the NAFIA include the elimination of

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

both tariff and non-tariff barrier to trade in, and facilitating cross border movement of goods
and services between its members. Id.
at 307. Furthermore, the NAFTA seeks to increase investment opportunities, to promote fair competition within the area, and to effectively provide protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Id.
Id.at 308 (i.e. a free trade area). Not only does the NAFTA ignore immigration issues, but except
for computer products, it also fails to deal with a CET. Id.
Id. at 307.
Id.
See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 499.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308.

158

NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas

ferences in macroeconomic policy, trade imbalances, and other disagreements. 204 Yet, by
the time the NAFTA is fully implemented at the beginning of the new millennium,
Mercosur will be a free trade area with a partial CET.205 However, there is no reason
Mercosur, as a customs union, would be proscribed from entering into a free trade agreement with the NAFTA member states as a step in the eventual formation of the FTAA. 206
Mercosur's effectiveness, however, has not gone unquestioned. 207 Specifically, it is
alleged that the very products showing the most promising export growth within
Mercosur are the same products Mercosur members demonstrated an inability to export
competitively outside the region. 20 8 This evidence mostly focuses on the rapid increase in
intra-regional export in the capital-intensive auto industry. 209 Of course, other commentators classify Mercosur as different from previous regional arrangements that attempted
to protect internal industries and to isolate economies from outside competition. 2 10 The
pundits claim, however, that this means "the regional orientation of exports is growing
most rapidly for products where there is no evidence that Mercosur has any natural comparative advantage:' 211 Thus, Mercosur is accused of distorting trade. 2 12
Others argue, that since Mercosur's inception its trading partners successfully
21 3
increased their sales to the region at comparable levels to Mercosur members.
Furthermore, intra Mercosur trade is lauded as very significant and normal for economi-

cally strong countries like Brazil and Argentina, in which trade was significantly attenuated
prior to the Mercosur agreement due to high tariffs. 214 Furthermore, since Mercosur's
duty-free treatment of automobiles will not be applied until the year 2000, "it is not
because of Mercosur, but rather in spite of it, that the intra Mercosur trade in automobiles
has boomed in recent years. '2 15

However, outside the debate surrounding fast-track, it is possible that the NAFTA's present structure is too complex to expand to large groups of additional state parties. 216 It was

204. See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 499. Furthermore, by the target date of December, 31,
1994, none of these goals had been accomplished. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 308. By this date, a
CET was in existence for only about 85% of the items found in Mercosur's nomenclature. Id. In
addition, intra-regional free trade was present for only about 90% of the harmonized tariff
schedule. Id. Post-Mercosur agreements between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
delayed implementation of the intra-regional free trade area respectively until 1999 and 2000. Id.
Furthermore, the implementation of the Common External Tariff was also postponed until at
least 2006. Id.
205. O'Keefe, supranote 95, at 309.
206. Id.
207. Stephen Fidler, Is Mercosur Protectionist?,FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at 3. See generally, THE
ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds.,
1996).
208. Fidler, supra note 207.
209. Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Which Mercosur?,LATINFINANCE, Jan. 11, 1997, at 70.
210. Id.
211. Fidler, supranote 207, at 3.
212. Id.
213. Mendoza, supra note 209, at 70.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Gantz, supranote 39, at 401.
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suggested by the Canadian Trade Minister, Art Eggelton, that "these two agreements have
fundamentally different objectives and could not be merged without one or the other dispensing with its core objectives." 217 First, along with labor and environmental issues unpopular with Latin American nations, NAFTA membership includes more than twelve different
tariff phase-out schedules. 2 18 In addition, the NAFTA has a complex set of rules of origin, as

well as many schedules for the phasing out of market access for services. 219 This complexity
is not overwhelming in terms of the present three-member NAFTA, however,
this level of
220
complexity applied to a NAFTA comprised of many members seems a stretch.
B.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN MERCOSUR AND THE NAFrA.

The primary difference between Mercosur and the NAFTA is that one is a free trade
area and the other is a customs union. The NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994,
and is a free trade area in which no tariffs or quotas are imposed on goods originating in
and traded among the member states.221 On the other hand, while a custom union also
eliminates tariffs and quotas, it applies a common external tariff applicable to goods origi222

nating from nonmember states.

Mercosur was originally conceived as a bilateral common market between Argentina
and Brazil to be incorporated into the ALADI. 223 In the end, the Mercosur treaty was
signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay on March 26, 1991.224 Generally, its
stated objectives include the elimination of trade barriers, the establishment of a common
225
external tariff, coordination of macroeconomic policies, and harmonization of laws.
This treaty was officially implemented by the "Protocol of Ouro Preto" by the member
states on December 17, 1994.226
To benefit from the NAFTAs free trade framework, goods must be completely produced or wholly obtained in and with materials originating from any of the member
states.227 Nonetheless, a nonqualified good may meet a regional value content.228 In
contrast to these incomprehensible content measurements, Mercosur's approach involves
217. Id at 404.
218. Id. at 401. Tariff elimination schedules range from immediate, to time periods as long as fifteen
years. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in InternationalTrade Treaties: Toward the FTAA, 14 ARIz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L.411 (1997).
222. Id. at 411.
223. See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 4, at 498.
224. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter"Mercosur"].
225. Id. at 1044-45.
226. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, Dec.
17, 1994,Arg. Braz.-Para.-Uru., 341L.M. 1244 (1995).
227. NAFTA, supra note 169, at arts. 401,415.
228. Id. at arts. 402,(2)-(3). Goods not meeting a shift in tariff classification may nonetheless qualify
for duty-free status if the regional value content requirement is met Id. This content must be at
least 60% under the transactional-value method, or at least 50% under the net-cost method.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 309. Note that some products, like motor vehicles and automotive
parts, must be valued per the net-cost method. Id.
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a simple determination that the good must originate or be produced from components
originating within Mercosur. 229 Mercosur's rules of origin are simpler because the bloc
intends to become a customs union by 2006, thus the need for rules of origin will be
230
moot.
In addition, a .complex system of rules of origin arguably discriminate in favor of
countries like the United States or Canada. 23 1 This discrimination is due to of the complexity in demonstrating compliance, for which countries like Canada and the United
States have the sophistication and resources to assure that only qualifying goods receive the
benefits of the NAFTA. 232 This is a luxury that countries of more meager resources cannot afford. 233 However, the Mercosur signatories, Chile, and Bolivia agreed to set up a
joint electronic customs system to reduce transshipment fraud. 234 Nevertheless, the rules
of origin espoused by the NAFTA are condemned as a trade obstacle that implies "buy
North American, or else... '235 In addition, valuation and classification is complex and
expensive for companies, forcing them to pay the U.S. tariff of 2.5 percent, for example, in
automobiles, rather than to evaluate the North American value-added content. 236 On the
other hand, the rules of origin under Mercosur are both more liberal and less
complicated. 237 For example, Mercosur's common external tariff eliminates most prob238
lems associated with transshipment of goods.

229. See Mercosur, supra note 224, at 1054-58. In the alternative, to qualify, a good must be substantially transformed within Mercosur to qualify. Id
230. O'Keefe, supranote 95, at 310. This is because all foreign imports will be charged uniform duties
upon entrance to Mercosur and then the goods will be able to move around duty free throughout
the customs union. Id.
231. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
232. Id.
233. Gantz, supranote 39, at 401.
234. Customs,LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MExico AND NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4. Argentina estimated
that this type of transshipment fraud by evasion of the Value Added Tax is costing them U.S. $21
billion in lost revenues. Id.
235. Silveira, supranote 223, at 448.
236. Id. at 449. Television manufacturers could also prefer to pay a 5%tariff to trace the value added
content. Id.
237. Gantz, supranote 39, at 402.
238. Id.As an illustrative example, an exporter wanting to circumvent a higher import tariff to Mexico
of 15% could first import the goods into the United States which has a 5%tariff, and subsequently transship the goods to Mexico, a strategy which is taken care of by a system like the
NAFTA. Id. at n. 134. Acustoms union like Mercosur eliminates the financial incentive to transship since all members share an equal external tariff. I&.at 402.
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As the United states lags further in passing fast-track, the rules of origin and local content requirement provide disincentive to purchase U.S. goods. 239 To benefit from
Mercosur's tariff reduction by meeting local content requirements, world companies will
Mercosur member
no longer desire U.S. parts or components-these will come from
240
states, will result in the loss of U.S. jobs and a strain on the economy.
In the context of the future FTAA, because the NAFTA has no CET, the lack of high
content requirements will allow nonmember countries to export components for assembly
to the NAFTA country levying the lowest tariff on semi-finished goods. Subsequently,
nonmember countries can use that country to access the other members, thereby evading
higher external tariffs. 24 1 Thus, in the context of the FTAA, if the NAFTA's rule mechanism is adopted to comply with those stricter regional content requirements,
Mercosurmembers will be forced to switch present input sourcing from cheaper and higher quality European and Asian sources to North American input sourcing. 242 This switch
leads to trade diversion, in direct opposition to WTO mandates. 243 In general, the sentiunder a banner of collective action,
ment of many Latin American nations is that even 244
environmental and labor strings will not be accepted.
Legally conforming the NAFTA and Mercosur is a formidable task for many reasons. 245 Thus, replication of the NAFTA modeling for rules of origin will not realistically
be replicated in a trade agreement encompassing the entire hemisphere. 246 For example,
unlike NAFTA members, who are free to set their own external tariffs, Mercosur's custom
247
In
union applies a uniform common external tariff to all imports from nonmembers.
addition, the NAFTA, as opposed to Mercosur, incorporates a comprehensive set of investment protections like binding arbitration procedures between host country and foreign
investors. 248 With the exception of Chile, which accepted a similar concession in its bilateral trade agreement with Canada, many Latin American nations will be reluctant to
accept binding investment dispute international arbitration. 249 Specifically, the two agreements differ greatly in the manner they entertain the following:

239. PreparedTestimony of Joseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means; Subcomm. on Trade,supra note 5.
240. Id.
241. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 310.
242, Id.
243. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
244. Carol Stump, Free TradeArea of the Americas, 4 J.INT'L L.& PRAc. 153, 157 (1995).
245. Gantz, supra note 39, at 403.
246. Silveira, supra note 221, at 453.
247. Gantz, supra note 39, at 402. A common external market is not outside the reach of NAFTA
members, but due to GATT's mandate of avoiding increases of duties, this must require Canada
and Mexico to reduce their import duties. At a post-Uruguay Round level, U.S. tariffs of 3.5%
will still be substantially lower that any other nation in the hemisphere. Id.
248. Id.at 403.
249. Id. Argentina, which has a similar provision to Chapter 11 of NAFTA in its bilateral investment
agreement with the United States, will not have reason to disagree with international arbitration
of investment disputes. Id
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1.

Government Procurement.

Mercosur does not deal with market access to government entities for foreign sellers,
i.e., government procurement. 250 The NAFTA, on the other hand, provides for procedures through which companies from one member can bid for federal government procurement contracts for services or goods in the other two signatories. 25 1 In addition, a
bidder is not required to purchase local supplies.252 Finally, the NAFTA accordingly allows
for an independent review of the bidding process through a guaranteed bid challenge
253
mechanism.
Mercosur, on the other hand, is silent on access to government procurement contracts. 254 For example, Brazil, the dominant member of Mercosur, retained a provision
255
reserving the right to discriminate in favor of its nationals in these types of contracts.
Furthermore, 1994 Brazilian legislation allows the Brazilian Government and "para-statal"
entities the right to discriminate in favor of either domestic companies or foreign compa256
These kinds of self-interest laws that attenuate access to govnies operating in Brazil.
ernment procurement contracts will likely be a roadblock to a possible incorporation of
257
Mercosur and NAFTA ideals.
2.

FinancialServices.

Mercosur generally does not deal with financial services. 258 Under the NAFTA, financial service providers may set up business and serve dients from another member state on
an equal level to that granted domestic firms. 259 Indeed, most-favored-nation treatment is
accorded to member nations. 260 A member is not required to permit nonresident financial firms to do business or to solicit clients within its territory, however, the member state
may not proscribe its citizens from using any firm they choose. 261 Mercosur's take on
capability to purchase and trade listed stock
financial services involves private investors'
262
from the other Mercosur member states.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 403-04.
NAFTA, supra note 169, at art. 1003.
Id.
Id. at art. 1017.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 311.
Id.
Id. These laws apply to telecommunication, computer, software and digital equipment and services. Id.
Id.
Gantz, supra note 39, at 404.
NAFTA, supra note 169, at arts. 1403, 1405.
Id. at art. 1406.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 312.
Id. This concession by Brazil is significant because it limits the purchase and sale of stock listed in
its trade exchanges by foreigners to institutional investors. Id. Minimal standards as to the offering of publicly traded stock by regional companies, as well as common rules on mutual funds
and stock exchange operation, were also agreed upon in August 1993. Id.
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3. Telecommunications.
While Mercosur fails to address telecommunications, 263 NAFTA members enjoy
open telecommunication transport networks and services. 264 In addition, all licensing,
permit registration, and notification procedures must be "transparent and non-discriminatory."265 Furthermore, applications filed thereunder must be processed expeditiously.266 Although the NAFTA allows monopolies to freely operate in providing public
telecommunications transport network or services, a monopoly may not abuse its position
26 7
by attenuating competition through cross-subsidization or predatory conduct.

Furthermore, discriminatory access to otherwise public telecommunication transport ser268
vices or networks is prohibited.
On the other hand, Mercosur all but ignores the telecommunications sector. 269 The
off limits mentality is pervasive in Mercosur members, since the telecommunications sector has traditionally been limited to domestic control. 270 Therefore, considering the
United States competitive advantage, it is highly unlikely that any concessions will be given
27 1
by Mercosur to open up this field.
4. Intellectual Property.
The NAFTA deals extensively with intellectual property, while the Mercosur agreement
fails to address a regime for these rights.272 The NAFTA is heavily involved in the protection
of copyrights, trademarks, and patents. 273 Not only must the member states provide
enforcement of these rights in their territory, the members must also protect against the
enforcement becoming a restraint to legitimate trade. 274
The NAFTA further requires the protection of encrypted program-carrying satellite
signals and lay-out designs of semiconductor integrated circuits. 275 The NAFTA also
requires the protection of trade secrets and industrial designs. 276 In addition, members

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Gantz, supranote 39, at 404.
O'Keefe, supranote 95, at 311.
NAFrA, supranote 169, at art. 1303.
Id. at art. 1303.
Id. at art. 1305.
Id.
O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 311.
Id.
IaL
at 312.
Hicks & Holbein, supranote 6, at 804.
NAFTA, supranote 169, at arts. 1705, 1708, 1709.

274. Id. at art. 1701 (2). Furthermore, each member state has had to ratify the following: (1) the 1971
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of their Phonographs; (2) the 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works; (3) the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; and
(4) either the 1978 (UPOV Convention) International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, or the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants. I&.
275. Id. at arts. 1707 and 1710.
276. Id. at arts. 1711 and 1713.
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must ensure that procedures are established so that intellectual property rights are enforceable under both civil and criminal law.277 Finally, members must permit the national cus-

toms services to be used as enforcers of these rights by detaining counterfeit trademark or
278
pirated copyright goods at border checks.
In contrast, harmonization of intellectual property standards within the Mercosur
members is tentative. 279 This agreement has been mostly concerned with trademarks;
280
however, these measures have not been ratified by any member state other than Brazil.

This is primarily due to marked differences in the way the member nations' macroeconomic policies, intellectual property laws, and infrastructure in the governing bodies are
281
charged with the enforcement of laws.
Because of this wide chasm in the treatment of intellectual property, it is almost certain this area will be extremely hard to resolve. 282 Yet, Mercosur's involvement in the Paris
Convention, the Berne Convention, and the individual members' adoption of the TRIPS
agreement is promising. 283 Nonetheless, this issue is hard to resolve primarily because
Latin Americans view intellectual property protection as attempts by the have nations to
keep the have not nations both dependent on the first world for technology and in an
284
underdeveloped state.
5. Dispute Resolution.
Mercosur lacks the NAFTAs extensive level of government to government dispute resolution. 285 Nevertheless, recent agreements complemented Mercosur with both private
party as well as government dispute resolution. 286 However, settling disputes in the areas
of countervailing duty and anti-dumping actions differ greatly in Mercosur and the
NAFTA. 287 In the NAFTA negotiations, the United States was recalcitrant in not eliminating unfair trade actions or, to a lesser degree, according more lenient rules to NAFTA
members. 288 Furthermore, Mercosur fails to deal directly with intra-regional unfair trade
disputes and Mercosur, along with Mexico and Canada, will want a bar to anti-dumping
289
actions against duty free regionally made goods.
277. Id. at arts. 1715 and 1717.

278. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 313.
279. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 801.
280. O'Keefe, supranote 95, at 313.
281. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 6, at 801.

282. O'Keefe, supra note 95, at 314.
283. Hicks &Holbein, supra note 6, at 803.
284. O'Keefe, supranote 95, at 314.
285. Gantz, supra note 39, at 403.

286. See, eg., Protocol of Buenos Aires on International Jurisdiction in Disputes Relating to Contracts,
Sept., 1997, Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, 36 LLM. 1263 (1997); Protocol of Brasilia for

the Settlement of Disputes, May, 1997, Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay, 36 I.L.M. 691
(1997).
287. Gantz, supra note 39, at 404.

288. Id. NAFTA treatment is procedural, allowing review by binational arbitral panels instead of
national courts. However, the substantive law of the importing country applies. Id.
289. Id. This contention should be perfectly acceptable to the United States since price discrimination
is the primary reason for dumping, and this practice would be moot when no barriers to trade
exist. Id.
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III. What Is the Effect of Chile's Associate Membership in Mercosur and
its Promised "Most Favored Trade Bloc" as it Relates to NAFTA
Accession.
On June 26, 1996, the day Chile committed itself to associate level membership in
Mercosur, NAFTA expansion into South America became next to impossible. 290 Chile's
official association with the Mercosur nations became effective on October 1, 1996.291
Article 52 states:
The contracting party that grants advantages, favors, perks, immunities or privileges to products native from or destined to another member country or not
member of the ALADI, for decisions or agreements that are not foreseen in the
treaty of Montevideo 1980 must: (a) Inform to the other contracting parties
within a term of fifteen (15) days of subscribing to the agreement, accompanied
by the text of the same and their complementary instruments; (b) Announce the
disposition to negotiate within a term of ninety (90) days, equivalent concessions
to those granted and received in a global manner; (c) In case of not arriving to a
solution mutually satisfactory in the negotiations foreseen in the literal b., the
parties will negotiate equivalent compensations, in a term of ninety (90) days; (d)
If an agreement in the negotiations established in the literal c. is not achieved, the
affected party will appeal to the procedure of solution of effective controversies in
292
the instant agreement
Chile seems bound to Mercosur. In essence, this article requires Chile to negotiate
equivalent compensation to Mercosur members. Thus, Chile is accountable to Mercosur
for concessions to the NAFTA or any other third party nation.293 The reality of this provision is presently being felt by Chile, since it is currently under attack by Mercosur demand290. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a FutureFree TradeArea of
the Americas?, supranote 41.
291. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.

292. Acuerdo Mercosur-Chile, <http://www.intr.net/mercosur/chiacue.htm.> (author's translation).
In the original Spanish:
Articulo 52.- La Parte Contratante que otorgue ventajas, favores, franquicias, inmunidades o privilegios a productos originarios de o destinados a cualquier otro pals
miembro o no miembro de la ALADI, por decisiones o acuerdos que no estdn previstos
en el Tratado de Montevideo 1980 deberA:
a. Informar a la otra Parte dentro de un plazo de quince (15) dias de suscrito el acuerdo, acompafiando el texto del mismo y sus instrumentos complementarios.
b. Anunciar en la misma oportunidad la disposici6n a negociar, en un plazo de noventa
(90) dias, concesiones equivalentes a las otorgadas y recibidas de manera global.
c.En caso de no legarse a una soluci6n mutuamente satisfactoria en las negociaciones
previstas en el literal b., las Partes negociardn compensaciones equivalentes, en un
plazo de noventa (90) dias.
d. Si no se lograra un acuerdo en las negociaciones establecidas en el literal c., la Parte
afectada podri al procedimiento de soluci6n de controversias vigente en el presente
Acuerdo.

293. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free TradeArea of

the Americas?' supra note 41. Mercosur encompasses approximately 200 million people with a

GDP totaling about 50% of Latin America's total GDP. Mercosur to negotiate possible entry into
NAFTA as a bloc BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 14,1994.
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ing the same favorable agricultural tariff concessions Chile granted Canada in their bilater-

al trade agreement signed in 1996.294 This is problematic for Chile because its agreement
with Mercosur specifically excluded many agricultural products. 295
Thus, some commentators are of the opinion that Chile can no longer independently
negotiate with the NAFTA because, among other reasons, Chile's associate membership
agreement with Mercosur requires that any favorable tariff concession ceded by Chile to a
third party nation, such as those comprising the NAFTA, must also extend to all Mercosur
members. 296 Other commentators, however, indicate that this agreement is "apparently
structured" so as to permit Chilean NAFTA accession without problems. 297 This has been
held to be true since Chile is not bound to Mercosur's common external tariff.298
Nevertheless, other negotiated terms of the Mercosur-Chile agreement include a freeing of tariffs on October 1, 1996, applied to a third of all products traded between the two
signatories. 299 Furthermore, the Mercosur tariffs on Chilean products decreased from 8.2
percent to 5.6 percent. 300 There is hope that by 2004, 70 percent of all trade between the
two parties will be tariff-free. 30 1 Indeed, with the Mercosur, Chile has access to the
Atlantic Ocean and Mercosur has access to the Pacific and more importantly, the Asian
market.

302

In summary, Chilean exports to Mercosur increased by 3 percent between October
1996 and June 1997.303 In addition, the rise in imports from Mercosur remained at the
same pace from the rest of the world-for a total increase of 8 percent. 304 Indeed, Chile
wants its agreement with Mercosur to extend to services and to eliminate nontariff barriers. 30 5 Finally, Chile also wants to improve procedures for dispute settlement and to
306
include the automobile sector in their agreement.

294. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a FutureFree TradeArea of
the Americas?,supra note 41.
295. Chile's Deal With the MERCOSUR, LATN AM. REG'L REP.: Max. & NAFTA REP., July 18, 1996, at 1.

These products include meat, comestible oil, and sugar, all of which are tariff protected for the
next 15 years. The Chilean wheat market will not be open to Mercosur until 2014. Id.
296. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond Does the Road Lead to a Future Free TradeArea of
the Americas?, supranote 41.
297. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
298. Id.
299. Chile LATIN AM. REG'L REP.: MEx. & NAFTA REP., Oct. 21,1997, at 4.

300. Id.
301. Id

302. Imogen Mark and David Pilling, Jilted Chile Hitches Up to Mercosur:.Customs Union Gains the
Region'sMost Stable and Successful Economy, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at 3.
303. Chile, supra note 299.
304. Id.
Total trade for Chile and Mercosur included U.S.$2.19 billion imports from and $1.32 billion
export to Mercosur. Id
305. Id.
306. Id.
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IV. Chile's Bilateral FTA. Is It a NAFTA "Light" or a Fullblown NAFMA?
Answer: Both.
The Canadians saw and jumped toward the opportunities available with a bilateral
trade agreement with Chile, however, the United States is slow to learn. Accordingly, Chile
reacted to U.S. inaction by pursuing this agreement as well as with Mercosur. 307 Both
seem on the right track since trade between Chile and Canada is projected to increase five
fold in the next decade over the current level of $670 million per year.308 Furthermore,
Chile's market is rapidly expanding---an expansion that is coupled with high consumer
purchasing power. 309 In addition, Chile has a strong economy and an unemployment rate
of 5 to 6 percent. 310 Finally, it is unlikely that there will be a monetary crisis such as that
which soured the trade expected with Mexico through the NAFTA. 3 11 Also, unlike
312
Mexico, there is little concern in losing manufacturing jobs.
In another context, the Chile-Canada bilateral trade agreement is taking money from
U.S. companies. For example, a Canadian supplier of packaged homes, Viceroy Homes
Ltd., outbid U.S. competitors for the business of a Chilean distributor.313 In addition,
examples of how U.S. companies are starting to use their Canadian subsidiaries to trade
with Chile include General Electric-Canada's bid to supply two sets of hydroturbines and a
generator for a hydroelectric project in southern Chile and Ford Motor Co. shipping "the
3 14
popular F series pickup trucks" to Chile.
Nevertheless, the Chile-Canada bilateral free trade agreement both furthers and
detracts from the basics of the NAFTA framework as it relates to Chilean NAFTA accession. There are several reasons why the Canadian-Chilean free trade agreement creates
fundamental problems for Chilean accession to the NAFTA. First, Chile successfully nego315
tiated a provision that kept its price band mechanism for specific agricultural products.
In the past, the United States branded these concessions as protectionist mechanisms to
the competitive disadvantage of some U.S. exports. 316 But the fact that Chile's Frei
administration secured these terms could be reasonably expected in light of the trade

307. Gantz, supranote 39, at 400.
308. Free Trade with Chile; Chile's Senate Ratifies a Free Trade Agreement with Canada That Would
Eliminate Most Tariffi Over the Next 18 Years, McCLEAN's, July 14. 1997, at 39.

309. Marsha Stopa, Chilly to Chile: Every Nation Is Eagerfor a Trade Pactwith Chile Except, It Seems,
the U.S., CRAIN'S INT'L., June 16, 1997.

310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id.
Id.
John Urquhart, Canada is Hot for Latin American Trade, Dow JoNEs NEws SERV.-WALL ST. J.
STORIES, Nov. 6, 1997.

314. Id.
315. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a FutureFree Trade Area of
the Americas?, supranote 41.
316. Id Furthermore, 92% of exports will enter Canada tariff free, a status also applied to 76% of
Canadian exports of electronics and automobiles. Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile Trade. Accord with
CanadaSets Several Firsts,IN'IRaPRESS SERV., July 4, 1997. In addition, tariffs will be lifted on 91%
of Chilean agricultural products presently-a figure that will rise to 100% by the year 2003. Id.
Wheat flour, however, will retain its tariff protection until the year 2014. Id.
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deficit between Chile and Canada. 317 Indeed, the trade benefit was negotiated with an eye

318
toward reducing that deficit.
Second, Chile secured a provision preserving Chile's capital retention program. 319
Through this program, foreign investment capital may not be returned to the originating

country for a maximum of one year.320 Third, Chile secured Canada's concession that 30

percent of portfolio investment will be deposited in a noninterest bearing account at the
321
Chilean Central Bank for up to a year.
Fourth, the rule of origin requirements negotiated between Chile and Canada include
a 35 percent regional content requirement for a great variety of manufactured goods to be
traded tariff free. 322 This requirement was intended to allow manufacturers the benefits of

317. Gonzalez, supra note 316.
318. Id. In 1996, Chilean exports to Canada totaled U.S. $140 million (out of total sales of U.S. $15.3
billion) while imports from Canada totaled U.S. $408 million (total deficit of U.S. $268 million).
Id.
319. Thomas A. O'Keefe, Andean Community Update, MercosurDevelopments, and ProgressToward a
Free Trade Area of the Americas?", LATIN AM. L.Bus. REP., May 31, 1997. NAFTA rules of origin,
on the other hand, are arguably very favorable to Canada because, in demonstrating compliance,
regional calculations are easier for a country with its resources. Gantz, supra note 39, at 401.
320. Chile News: Chile commits to 30% "Encaje" in Canada Deal, EMERGING MARKETS REP., Nov. 15,
1997.
321. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41. Historically, the United States has held the opinion that such concessions (i.e., capital retention program and portfolio investments) allow for strong barriers
against foreign investment, and are not tolerated in any NAFTA accession negotiations with
Chile. Id. Indeed, the 11% reduction in price, due to Canada's treaty with Chile, was an important factor in awarding a U.S. $200 million order for cable-telephone technology from Nortrel,
instead of a U.S. company like Motorola, Lucent, or Scientific Atlanta, all of which manufacture
similar equipment. U.S. Regional Update, Chile -- AMCHAM: NAFTA Exclusion Hurts U.S.
Business, supra note 127. For the same reason, Quaker Fabric Company of Fall River,
Massachusetts, lost a $1.8 million Chilean account to a Mexican competitor. PreparedTestimony
ofJoseph Gorman, Chairmanand CEO of TRW, Inc., Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means;
Subcomm. on Trad4 supra note 5. In general, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has established
that U.S. exports are experiencing loss of opportunity to the amount of $480 million per year -- a
figure that will only rise in the future. Schumacher, supra note 34. Another example is found in
TRC Co. from Windsor, Connecticut, which engineered a $25 million landfill, yet is hobbled by
Chilean tariffs and laws requiring a 20% withholding from its fees. Magnusson, supra note 66.
Even further, over 50 joint Chilean-Canadian ventures are presently operating in Chile, some of
which are taking full advantage of shipping to other Latin American countries that have preferential trade with Chile, but not Canada. Urquhart, supra note 313.
322. Fast-Track,NAFTA, MERCOSUR and Beyond: Does the road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of
the Americas?, supra note 41. Indeed, the NAFTA required 60% minimum content requirements
for a wide range of manufactured goods. Id. In comparison, the according minimum regional
content requirement is over 60%. O'Keefe, supranote 95.
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preferential access without a requisite change in current sourcing of materials and parts.3 23
In addition, the agreement, unlike the NAFTA, takes no account of promoting cross-border investments in the financial services sector, as well as excluding government procurement.324 Finally, the agreement eliminates both the use of anti-dumping duties and countervailing duty cases against imports from either country immediately for duty free goods,
325
and for all others within six years.
Under this agreement, tariff exempt status was respectively conferred to 92 percent of
Chilean exports to Canada and 76 percent of Canadian exports to Chile.326 Furthermore,
the same treatment was given to 91 percent of Chilean agricultural products--lO0 percent
by 2003.327 However, the wheat flour tariff on imports from Canada will not be removed
until 2014, as well as for machinery, fertilizer, or other imported equipment.3 28
On the other hand, the Chile-Canada bilateral free trade agreement deals with several
areas in which Mercosur is lacking. For example, this agreement includes a side agreement
on environmental cooperation. 329 This agreement was modeled after the NAFTA, with
accommodation to minimize institutional requirements and with the idea that it would be
interim in nature with a pending Chilean NAFTA accession. 330 Accordingly, this agreement also includes treatment of investment, services, communications, and temporary
331
entry for business purposes.
In addition, the Chile-Canada FTA contains an agreement on labor cooperation. 332
This agreement also departs in nature from the NAFTA based on its transitory nature. 333
Primarily, this side agreement creates a Commission for Labor Cooperation, supported by
a National Secretariat in both countries. 334 Furthermore, this council may receive assistance from working groups, committees, and experts that can be self assigned.3 35

323. Canada-Chile: Free Trade Agreement, Sept., 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1067 (1997) [hereinafter Free Trade
Agreement].
324. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
325. Id. Canada negotiated for similar concessions in the NAFTA, but the United States' position
countered, and ultimately won. O'Keefe, supra note 95. Furthermore, the elimination of anti-

dumping and countervailing duty actions between Chile and Canada are subject to a review after

five years. Gantz, supra note 39, at 405. Nonetheless, the inclusion of these provisions in the
Chile-Canada treaty is consistent with Canada's previous fight for their inclusion into the NAFTA
agreement and the Canadian government's eventual desire to "eliminate the use of anti-dumping
duties within NAFTA" Id.
326. Gonzalez, supra note 316.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Free Trade Agreement, supranote 323.
330. kL
331. Gantz, supra note 39, at 400.
332. Free Trade Agreement, supranote 323.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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V. Condusions.
The concept of western hemispheric integration, as roughly imagined in the early
nineteenth century by Simon Bolivar, Latin America's great liberator, 336 and articulated
through the passing of the NAFTA and the Summit of the Americas, is up in the air. A

bitter division in this country's trade direction was primarily caused by the NAFTA's assodated environmental and labor issues and by partisan politics. As a result, the window of
opportunity for Chile's ascension to the NAFTA, an almost given in 1994, has been attenuated while politicians wrangle over the future health of the global economies of the twenty-first century.
Selfishly and necessarily, the United States must promote its own commercial selfinterest as the frantic process of hemispheric integration charges forward. Indeed, the crucial issue here is not whether protectionism, regionalism, multilateralism, trade diversion,
labor, or the environment are at stake; rather, the issue is that the prize (the Latin
American market) is coveted by the EU and Asia and any other possible competitor who
can pick up a phone and set up a trade accord. In simple terms, this issue really centers on
a race requiring immediate U.S. action, whether in the formation of a FTAA, an increase in
NAFTA membership, or in the securing of preferential trade agreements. This type of
action is needed for the continued strength of our economy in the new millennium.
Whether one loves or loathes the debate over the relative merits of free trade or protectionism, the United States cannot afford to remain idle while others jockey for the best
seat at the trade table. Of course, the United States must continue to provide the leadership role in a class of international agreement it basically created. The complexities
accompanying market need, totalitarianism and corruption, drugs, and transient labor and
populations are the concepts the United States should not bow down to. However, by
active engagement in this race, the United States will secure its rightful place at the table,
while continuing to promote Latin America's permanent move away from the protectionism and state-dominated economic policies of the past. Thus, it is imperative that the
United States attend the 1998 presidential summit to be held in Chile with fast-track
authority enacted. This authority will ensure that the momentum created by the Miami
Summit of 1994 will allow for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements primarily, but
not exclusively, with Chile. These agreements should be independent of the NAFTA.
Outside of the concerns raised or associated with article 52 of the Mercosur-Chile
agreement, by moving ahead with fast-track and establishing a bilateral trade agreement
instead of pursuit of NAFTA accession, the United States could solve some of the problems
with Chilean NAFTA accession. Primarily, popular and political success should be associated with a bilateral treaty because the NAFTA's environmental and labor side issues are as
complex as its rules of origin. Furthermore, we should also avoid the NAFTA dispute resolutions. These provisions are problematic in terms of non-contiguous South American
countries. Secondly, these aspects of the NAFTA are better handled, if not better received
by Latin America, through independent and specific agreements. In addition, the divisive
stigma associated with the NAFTA could be left by the wayside.

336. Dusseau, supra note 2.
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Thus,- considering the prize at hand with fast-track, a bilateral trade deal with Chile
lacking the complexities of the NAFTA encompasses a better venue to restart the United
States' momentum in anticipation of the presidential summit of 1998 to be held in Chile.
Furthermore, taking the path of Canada, the United States should loosen its trading rigidities and conclusively negotiate less complicated and more advantageous agreements. More
importantly, the NAFTA stigma could be alienated, allowing the United States to solidify
its standing as the trade leader in this hemisphere by forging ties with Chile and by asserting that U.S. leadership will point the way to the successful integration of this hemisphere.
The Chilean Minister of the Interior, Eduardo Aninat, concurred in some ways with this
belief by agreeing that a bilateral agreement is a worthy goal if both countries can negotiate a "symmetrical" agreement based on NAFTA principles, such as those Chile enjoys with
37
Canada.3

337. Chile-Trade: Chile-US tradepact nears signing, supranote 177.
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Corrigendum
In Volume 3, Number 4, two tables were inadvertently left out of Alfredo G. Romero's
"The Letter of Intent in International Syndicated Financing: An Analysis of the English
and American Law from a Sovereign Borrower's Perspective." Pages 81 and 83 of that issue
should have appeared as follows:

